In his history of MI5, Christopher Andrew says:
Short-termism has been the distinguishing intellectual vice of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. For the first time in recorded history, there has been a widespread assumption that the experience of all previous generations is irrelevant to present policy.
This is particularly important in Europe because, as Allan Little said,
In Europe history is the unseen guest at every table.
When I started to teach European Institutions at this University at the age of 50, I had to remember that the Second World War was as remote from the personal experience of my students as the closing decade of the reign of Queen Victoria was to mine. So I began by explaining what were the causes of the War and the significance of the Schuman Declaration in 1950.
By the next year, I realized that the causes of the Second World War couldn't be understood without understanding the causes and immediate aftermath of the First. I said this to a friend from undergraduate days who had become a history teacher. He replied, "Not at all: you can't begin later than 1783".
We tend nowadays to assume that the Europe shown here -a Europe of nation states with defined and accepted frontiers -is stable and will continue.
EUROPE TODAY
We assume that we have, in that notorious phrase, reached the end of history. That is an unsafe assumption.
John Maynard Keynes was one of the British experts at the Peace Conference during the first six months of 1919. He devoted the rest of the year to writing The Economic Consequences of the Peace -an exception to the late Lord Cameron's dictum that Professor Youngson's book on The Making of Classical Edinburgh is the only readable book written by an economist.
Keynes began with this warning:
The power to become habituated to his surroundings is a marked characteristic of mankind. Very few of us realize with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic organization by which Western Europe has lived for the last half century. We assume some of the most peculiar and temporary of our late advantages as natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and we lay our plans accordingly. On this sandy and false foundation we scheme for social improvement and dress our political ambitions.
The warning is still valid. The experience of previous generations is not irrelevant to present policy. And history is still a guest at every table.
So, as I was advised to do, I begin with Europe in the eighteenth century, and I ask you to look particularly at the evolution of Central Europe and Eastern Europe. Indeed, it is sometimes said to have been one of the merits of the old Empires that they could accommodate such a varied linguistic and ethnic mixture. The Slovene Commissioner to the EU told me that his grandfather maintained that nothing had been quite the same since the end of the Austrian Empire because the administration was so efficient.
EUROPE 1730
By comparison with what we know today, the ethnic mix was extraordinary. For example, half the population of Salonika (now Thessaloniki) was Jewish and the remainder was a mixture of Greeks, Turks, Albanians and Armenians. Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, was born there.
The domination of Middle and Eastern Europe by the three Empires of Germany. Austria-Hungary and Russia had significant economic advantages which Keynes describes:
The interference of frontiers and of tariffs was reduced to a minimum, and not far short of three hundred millions of people lived within the three Empires of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. The various currencies, which were all maintained on a stable basis in relation to gold and to one another, facilitated the easy flow of capital and of trade to an extent the full value of which we only realise now, when we are deprived of its advantages.
LINGUISTIC EUROPE PRE-1914
Over this great area there was an almost absolute security of property and of person. Round Germany as a central support the rest of the European economic system grouped itself, and on the prosperity and enterprise of Germany the prosperity of the rest of the Continent mainly depended. He is the one to put in the dock of history.
An exaggeration, but to some extent a permissible one. Margaret MacMillan's superb book on the Peace Conference of 1919 (Peacemakers) shows how Woodrow Wilson had to compromise his principles in order to secure the creation of the League of Nations which he believed would resolve all outstanding problems.
The truth was that, from the beginning, the principle of self-determination was honoured as much in the breach as in the observance, notably as regards Germany and her neighbours -with particularly malign consequences for the peace of the world.  The German economy slid to financial disaster.
 The position of minorities became increasingly threatened, uncomfortable and, in some cases positively dangerous.
In the states that were subject to the Minority Treaties the League of Nations was entitled to exercise control over their national, religious and educational policies. The States objected to this because it limited their sovereignty and infringed their right to self-determination and implied that they were not competent to deal with domestic matters.
No such obligations had been placed on the established states of Western Europe, nor indeed on Germany (possibly because it had lost its former 'minorities' in Alsace-Lorraine to France, in North Schleswig to Denmark, and in Posen and parts of Silesia to Poland, and Jews had full rights of citizenship and religious freedom until 1933).
By 1937, the League of Nations had become effectively impotent, and more than half the states of Europe were ruled by authoritarian governments or outright dictatorships (pale yellow, pink and brown).
Czechoslovakia (pale blue) was by that time the only working democracy left in Middle and Eastern Europe.
Spain (coloured bright yellow), although nominally democratic, was in the grip of its civil war. Portugal had already fallen under the autocratic rule of Salazar -incidentally a professor of economics.
One year later, Czechoslovakia came under attack for purportedly denying the rights of the minority German community in the Sudetenland. Faced with Hitler's threats which led to preparations for war, the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, spoke to the British people on the radio in plaintive tones:
How horrible, fantastic, incredible, it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing! So Czechoslovakia was sacrificed. A year later Hitler invaded Poland and the Second World began.
Why was it that all the hopes and expectations that accompanied the Peacemakers to Paris in 1919 had dissolved in disaster twenty years later? And why is it that, almost seventy years later, Europe appears to have achieved stability in its present shape?
I suggest that the key word is "stability". Throughout the whole of the period we have surveyed, the settlement of Europe was inherently unstable.
Keynes set out his criticism of the Peace of 1919 in his chapter on Europe after the Peace. He began:
This chapter must be one of pessimism. The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe -nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbours, nothing to stabilise the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the allies themselves.
It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problem of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four Woodrow Wilson, Clémenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando.
Keynes proposed three changes to the provisions of the Peace Treaties -A more realistic scheme of Reparations. The Treaty of Versailles required Germany to pay reparations while depriving it of the resources necessary to generate the money required to pay them; -Strengthening of the Coal Commission to give fair and equal access to the Europe's resources of coal and iron -including for Germany; Germany, as a state, ceased to exist and its territory was divided into four zones of occupation by the United States, Britain, Russia and France.
Apart from the millions who had been killed during the War, more than 10 million people were expelled from their homes and from what, for them and their families, had been their homeland. They became, in the bureaucratic terminology of the time, "displaced persons" and in some cases stateless persons.
Such expulsions -now known as "ethnic cleansing" -reduced the minorities from more than 25% of the population to less than 10%.
That is the main reason why the political frontiers of most of Middle Europe today coincide, more or less, with the linguistic frontiers.
Very soon thereafter, the Iron Curtain descended, and for the next forty years, the parts of Europe coloured grey on the map became, for most of us, "far away countries of which we knew nothing".
The frontiers of Poland became what they are today.
The Curzon line became the eastern frontier, and the loss of the eastern provinces was compensated by establishing the western frontier on the Oder and Neisse rivers, depriving Germany of the rest of Silesia, Pomerania and Prussia, including East Prussia. But the loss of the area round Wilno in the north did not benefit the Baltic Republics, since their sovereignty had been decisively lost to the Soviet Union at Yalta.
However, on a more positive note, in the five years after the War measures were taken to do what had not been done in 1919 to bring stability to the continent.
First, to the eternal credit of the United States, the Marshall Plan made it possible to deal with the immediate effects of hunger, displacement and physical and economic ruin. Remember Keynes : "It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problem of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four".
Second, the Convention on Human Rights addressed the most fundamental problems of a world of sovereign nation-states -how to protect minorities and prevent a repetition of the gross barbarities that had been committed during and after the War.
Third, the Schuman Plan addressed the problem of economic reconstruction and sharing of resources.
I will now say more about the second and third points, the Convention and the Schuman Plan. I repeat my disclaimer that I will not say anything about defence and security -notably the creation of NATO -which is not to say that they do not matter.
You will remember that one of the objections to the Minority Treaties was that they interfered with the autonomy of sovereign states. For a long time, it had been an article of faith for international lawyers and diplomats that States must be sovereign within their territory. States, they said, and States alone, are the "subjects" of international law. Individuals are merely its "objects". The sovereign State, in an exclusive and unprecedented ascendancy of power, has become the unsurpassable barrier between man and the law of mankind.
An enforceable International Bill of Rights would not be a break with what is truly permanent in the legal tradition of western civilisation but it would be in accordance with the purpose of the law of nations. That purpose cannot be permanently divorced from the fact that the individual human being -his welfare and the freedom of his personality in its manifold manifestations -is the ultimate unit of law.
Lauterpacht's book became a corner stone of the work of Eleanor Roosevelt's Committee that drew up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under the aegis of the newly-created United Nations. The Universal Declaration was followed by national Bills of Rights and some regional Charters of Rights.
The first of these was the European Convention on Human Rights. Remember that Hitler came to power in Germany through democratic election. One of the problems for judges in Nazi Germany was that the legislation depriving the Jews of civil rights had been passed by an elected legislature. Judges who could not bring themselves to apply it had no alternative but to resign and lose their salaries and pensions.
The purpose of the post-war Bills of Rights was, as Lauterpacht had said, to limit the exclusive sovereignty of states and therefore to limit the power of democratically elected assemblies to enact laws inconsistent with the agreed minimum standard of human or basic rights, and to require judges to enforce them.
It is important to be straight about this: the European Convention was and is intended to limit the powers of parliaments, politicians, administrators and judges.
I will come back to the Convention in a minute or two. At this stage, I would like to speak about the Schuman Declaration of 9 th May 1950.
Robert Schuman was born and brought up in Luxembourg. His father was a German citizen and Schuman studied at Bonn, Munich, Berlin and Strasbourg (then in Germany). He became Mayor of Metz (then also in Germany). After the First World War, Alsace-Lorraine returned to France. Schuman became a French citizen and was elected to the National Assembly. During the Second World War he was active in the Resistance and was imprisoned by the Germans. After the War, he was briefly (on two occasions) Prime Minister of France and for five years Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was one of the authors of the NATO Treaty, and a signatory of the Treaty of London establishing the Council of Europe. In the light of his own experiences, he was a tireless advocate of the need for mutual understanding, especially between France and Germany. In a speech on 9 th May 1950 he said:
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.
With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.
In essentials, the Schuman Plan met precisely the conditions that Keynes had found wanting in the settlement of 1919. It led, as we know, to the creation of the Coal and Steel Community, followed by the European Economic Community and, in due course, the European Union with its three pillars, now brought together by the Lisbon Treaty
This system was, and is, based on mutually agreed and legally enforceable texts, with institutions capable of implementing and, within limits, enforcing them. As Jean Monnet said:
Nothing is possible without people; nothing is lasting without institutions.
So, by the time of the next great upheaval -the Fall of the Wall and the collapse of the Soviet system at the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s -Western Europe had achieved a state of relative, though not complete, stability, economic and political.
What differentiated the situation after 1989 from the situation in the 1920s and 1930s were two things (or two aspects of the same thing):
 The existence of an institutional structure offered the newly liberated countries of Middle and Eastern Europe a prospect of stability to which they could aspire; and  It provided the framework within which the countries of Western Europe could co-ordinate their approach to the aspirant countries and their problems. In the same year (1991), I was a member of the Foundation Senate for a new University at Frankfurt-on-the-Oder (the "other Frankfurt") -renewing the ancient Viadrina University where the Scottish reformer Alexander Ales (Alesius) took refuge in 1539. The aim was to create a university where students from west and east could study together.
The bridge over the Oder at Frankfurt is the crossing point for lorries bound for Warsaw and points east. In 1991 they sat for days in queues waiting for their turn to cross. Frankfurt itself was still a dismal ruin, but the town on the Polish side was worse. The only place that was large enough for us to meet the Polish representatives was the truckers café. I was deeply struck by their grey faces which matched their drab grey suits.
In the first year Viadrina had a few hundred students. There are now over 6,000 from all over Europe and beyond. The President is the former German Ambassador to the United Nations. His predecessor was Gesine Schwan, who was twice the unsuccessful SPD candidate for the Presidency of Germany.
When we met in 2011 for the twentieth anniversary celebrations, the atmosphere had totally changed. The very clear message from Germans and Poles alike was, "This is where Europe is being built -no longer in the tired countries of the west". This is happening in quite small personal ways too.
One of my colleagues on the Foundation Senate, the son of a Lutheran pastor in Pomerania, was one of those who, as a child, had had to make the trek west at the end of the War. He has created a friendship society for the German families who were forced out of their homes in his native village and the Polish families who moved into them. They had themselves been forced out of their homes further East by the Russians.
A German lawyer who came to Edinburgh in the 1970s with the British Council scheme for Young European Lawyers is devoting his retirement to creating a friendship society with the Russian community in Kaliningradold Königsberg -where his mother was born.
It is true that, by 1989/91, the problem of minorities had been substantially diminished -not by greater tolerance, but by forcible expulsion, or ethnic cleansing, during the German and Soviet occupation. All the same, minority problems have not gone away.
This is a supporter of the ice-hockey team of Miercurea Ciuc in the middle of Romania. But his T-shirt does not say Miercurea Ciuc; it says Székelyföld -a Magyar word, also written in the ancient Hungarian script below. The icehockey team members are all ethnic Hungarians and claim to be discriminated against by the authorities of Romania.
Even if minority problems have diminished in the countries of the EU, they remain acute in the Balkans and the countries round the Black Sea which are, after all, members of the Council of Europe and aspiring members of the EU. Churchill once remarked that "The Balkans produce more history than they can consume" and the same might be said of all these countries. This is a map of the ethnic mix of the Caucasus.
And here is a map of the linguistic mix of the same area:
The outstanding problems of these areas -not least in the light of the renewed ambitions of Russia -are immense. They affect the lives and aspirations of millions of people. They are Europeans like us, and they deserve more than to be treated as people in a far-away country of which we know nothing.
Robert Marjolin, one of the negotiators of the EEC Treaty, was both more sceptical, and I think more clear-sighted, than Monnet:
A treaty is just a piece of paper. One or more signatories can tear it up, admittedly, but that is equally true of any organisational formula: any legal construct is perishable. The only answer is the existence of a will to live together, the realisation by nation-states that, whatever the disadvantages of the Community, they are better off in it than out of it.
That is the moral case for seeking to build stable institutions in Europe. We must, of course, be realistic. Our institutions are not perfect. Luuk van
CAUCASUS LINGUISTIC PLURALITY CAUCASUS -ETHNIC PLURALITY
Middelaar is a historian who is a special adviser to Mr Van Rompuy, President of the European Council. At a conference last year, he said
The EU is a rule-based system, with attributed competences. It is not built to deal with fundamental shocks.
This was demonstrated by the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, which reflected no credit on "old Europe", and more recently by the financial crisis and the crisis of the Euro.
The search for uniform, comprehensive solutions to new and multifaceted problems, which the Treaty-makers could never have envisaged, runs the risk that the institutional structures of the EU and the ECHR will be stretched beyond their capacity and lose credibility.
There must be scope for the peoples of Europe to be different, and a continuing will to live together depends on the conditions on which we are asked to do so. So the Lisbon Treaty was wise to insist on subsidiarity.
Subsidiarity -the obligation to ask, Do we really need to do this in this way? -is a necessary condition of continued stability. It is also a moral principle.
Robert Schuman was right:
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.
But our journey will, as always, be like the Dance of Echternach -two steps forward, one step back.
